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ABSTRACT
The author analyses how debate over the ﬁfth edition
of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders has tended to privilege certain conceptions
of psychiatric diagnosis over others, as well as to
polarise positions regarding psychiatric diagnosis. The
article aims to muddy the black and white tenor of many
discussions regarding psychiatric diagnosis by moving
away from the preoccupation with diagnosis as
classiﬁcation and refocusing attention on diagnosis as a
temporally and spatially complex, as well as highly
mediated process. The article draws on historical,
sociological and ﬁrst-person perspectives regarding
psychiatric diagnosis in order to emphasise the
conceptual—and potentially ethical—beneﬁts of
ambivalence vis-à-vis the achievements and problems
of psychiatric diagnosis.
INTRODUCTION
‘To some extent every diagnosis brings asylum and
stigma.’1
In this article, I use the temporal vantage point of
the debates surrounding the ﬁfth edition of the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM–5) to trouble how they have
addressed psychiatric diagnosis and privileged
certain ethical positions and formulations over
others. The article aims to muddy the black and
white tenor of many DSM–5 discussions regarding
psychiatric diagnosis, to refocus attention on diag-
nosis as a complex, highly mediated process (in
contrast with the preoccupation with diagnosis as
classiﬁcation), and to raise to visibility the potential
ethical beneﬁts of remaining ambivalent as regards
the achievements and problems of psychiatric diag-
nosis. I write as a medical humanities scholar who
researches 20th and 21st century psychiatry, and
also as someone who has received psychiatric diag-
noses—and lived, ambivalently, with, through, and
perhaps beyond them—in the USA and the UK.
EXHAUSTING DIVISIONS
In the months prior to publication of DSM–5,
there was an explosion of print, broadcast and
online media discussions. In making my way
through these often angry discursive thickets, I
reﬂected on how they tended to prioritise particu-
lar kinds of ethical quandaries and positions over
others. (For example, the problematics of creeping
medicalisation and potential overdiagnosis were
very prominent,2 3 in comparison with the relative
absence of substantive discussion regarding, say,
what effects DSM–5 might have in the Global
South.) In the process, it became clear that many
discussions used a palette of black and white—a
palette with exiguous amounts of grey. (Headlines
such as ‘DSM–5: a manual run amok’,4 ‘The
DSM–5 is not crazy’5 and ‘Medicine’s big new
battleground: does mental illness really exist?’6 give
a taste of the affective intensity and polarisation in
the media.) What came to fascinate as well as
disturb me was the Manichaean character of these
discussions—the battles that attempted to carve
good from bad, true from misguided, what should
be defended from what should be destroyed. The
rhetorical certainty has been striking: many of
those critiquing the DSM–5 have had no qualms
with making bold judgements such as ‘the medical
model is bust’7; many of those defending DSM–5
seemed equally convinced of the forward march of
science and its incontrovertible beneﬁts for
patients. (For example, David Kupfer, Chair of the
DSM–5 Taskforce argued: ‘Science will advance
and we will learn more about the intersection of
brain, genes, environment and behaviour. DSM
must reﬂect that knowledge. Our patients will be
better off for it’.)8
Much of that Manichaeism is a function of how
media are structured to foment disagreements. But
that is not the whole story. It is helpful to attend to
how publication of the DSM–5 has reanimated
earlier, 20th century disputes about the effects of
psychiatric diagnosis, the role of psychiatry in
society and the so-called ‘(bio)medical model’.
Sometimes, it felt as though the debates over
DSM–5 had plunged us back into the 1960s and
1970s, the era of intense disagreements between
representatives of the psychiatric orthodoxy and
those positioned as ‘antipsychiatrists’. There is a
complex historicity of disputation within psych-
iatry: in this case, the DSM–5 has come to function
as a highly visible ﬂashpoint in a heterogeneous
mental health landscape, through which earlier dis-
putes and epistemological ﬁghts can be resurrected.
Currently, the temptation seems to have been to
caricature and isolate positions that are perceived
to be distinct from one’s own. This runs counter to
what Michael Staub, in his careful reassessment of
antipsychiatry in the 1960s and 1970s, has identi-
ﬁed as the ‘mutual entanglements of psychiatry and
antipsychiatry’ (italics added), entanglements that
continue up to the present. For example, many
powerful social theorisations of madness, as well as
critiques of psychiatry, emerged from within psych-
iatry as well as from outside of it; various argu-
ments about and analyses of the role of social
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processes in the generation of mental disorder criss-crossed psy-
chiatric and social scientiﬁc communities, rather than being gen-
erated and used solely in one domain or the other; and many
so-called ‘anti-psychiatry’ strands in the 1960s and 1970s advo-
cated complex and ambivalent positions regarding the so-called
psychiatric establishment, mental illness and the role of diagno-
sis.9 An acknowledgement of these mutual entanglements and
of the importance of ambivalence seems in short supply in
current DSM–5 debates, even as they revivify older vocabularies
and debates from the 1960s and 1970s.
Here are two examples, one taken from the heart of
American psychiatry, the other from a piece coauthored by a
prominent British clinical psychologist.i The ﬁrst is by the
President of the American Psychiatric Association, Jeffrey
Lieberman, and functioned as a defence of DSM–5 and a
response to its many critics. Lieberman stated with astonishment
that there are ‘groups who are actually proud to identify them-
selves as “antipsychiatry”’:
These are real people who don’t want to improve mental health-
care, unlike the … psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers and
patient advocates who have labored for years to revise the DSM,
rigorously and responsibly. Instead, they are against the diagnosis
and treatment of mental illnesses … and “against” the very idea
of psychiatry... They are, to my mind, misguided and misleading
ideologues and self-promoters who are spreading scientiﬁc
anarchy.10
Lieberman, while noting the inadequacies of psychiatric treat-
ment in the era of psychosurgery and insulin shock therapy,
could not conceive how there might be any defensible ‘antipsy-
chiatric’ challenge to today’s psychiatry of ‘psychopharma-
cology, neuroimaging, molecular genetics and biology’. Indeed,
his argument implicitly framed anyone not labouring to revise
the DSM ‘rigorously and responsibly’ as implacably opposed to
the improvement of mental healthcare. While there are some
organisations that are opposed to ‘the very idea of psychiatry’, it
is invidious and incorrect to regard all opposition to the DSM–
5 as equivalent to opposition to the improvement of mental
healthcare tout court.
The second is by Daniel Freeman (clinical psychologist) and
Jason Freeman (writer and editor):
Implicit here is a debate about the nature of mental illness. The
DSM uses a medical model of psychiatric illness. It thinks in terms
of separate, discrete disorders, just like physical medicine.….
[T]he psychological model of mental illness … [a]rgues that
there’s no binary opposition between disorder and ‘normality’.
Psychological disorders are simply the extreme manifestation of
traits that we all possess to varying degrees. …
[T]he sociological model … argue[s] that psychological disorders
aren’t illnesses at all. They’re a label used to stigmatize and
control behaviour society deems objectionable — such as homo-
sexuality, which featured in the DSM until 1980.
Our view is that psychological problems aren’t illusory. They are
real expressions of distress, for which most people—understand-
ably—want help.11
Here we see a binary division being made between those who
assert that mental illness is ‘illusory’ (‘the sociological model’,
on the Freemans’ account) and those who argue that mental
illness is ‘real’ (the psychiatric and the psychological models).
The sociological model is sketched as one that regards the
ascription of ‘disorder’ as merely a ‘label’ that facilitates stigma-
tisation and social control. Lieberman’s and the Freemans’
accounts are bathed in the waters of older modes of argument
and disciplinary expertise, though these are waters distilled from
what were originally more complex arguments. Lieberman and
the Freemans want, in different ways, to draw a ﬁrm line
between robust clinical models of mental illness/mental distress
and what lies beyond them—whether the so-called antipsychia-
trists who are supposedly spreading scientiﬁc anarchy, or the
sociologists who are supposedly arguing that psychological dis-
orders are ‘labels’ aiding the dubious project of social control.
The attempt to install this dividing line belies many of the
characteristics of mental health landscape: (1) there has for a
number of decades been signiﬁcant interpenetration of psychi-
atric, psychological and sociological styles and modes of
thought12 13; (2) ‘psychiatry’ is not a singular, discrete entity;
rather, as Pickersgill has argued, ‘it is a heterogeneous assem-
blage of interacting material and symbolic elements’, such that it
is unwise to assume that there can be any stable and straightfor-
ward critique of its practices and processes as a whole14; (3) the
mental health landscape is traversed by actors, groups and social
movements who ally themselves with—and distance themselves
from—others in complex conﬁgurations that can in no way be
adequately captured under the black and white monikers of
propsychiatry or antipsychiatry. The emergence of the ‘global
mental health movement’, the changing contours of the disabil-
ity movement, the rise of collaborative research involving clini-
cians and service user researchers, and the rich tapestry of (ex-)
service user movements all require more nuanced accounts of
the relations, partnerships and critiques that criss-cross psych-
iatry and mental health.15
However, many discussions regarding DSM–5 and psychiatric
diagnosis appear (as indicated by Pickersgill15a) to bracket or
occlude these complex histories and current realities. Such a dis-
cursive landscape too rapidly renders invisible less certain and
more ambivalent positions vis-à-vis psychiatric diagnosis. If such
complexity is forgotten or disavowed, it is difﬁcult for ethical
analyses to do justice to the range of positions and voices within
the broad mental health landscape. In addition, the rich histor-
ical archive of philosophical and political debates and disputes
over psychiatric diagnosis might well hold resources for current
clinical and social scientiﬁc research on psychiatric diagnosis:
these resources might not be recognised if attention is paid only
to more straightforward, one-dimensional accounts of diagnosis.
AMBIVALENCE AND MEDIATION
This article argues, then, for the potential ethical importance of
muddier, non-doctrinaire accounts of psychiatric diagnosis. I
mean muddier, here, as regards what diagnoses (can) do and
(can) not do; as regards who and what drive practices of psychi-
atric diagnosis; and as regards ambivalence in relation to the
uses, achievements and problems of psychiatric diagnosis. My
argument is subtended by the research I have conducted relating
to psychiatric diagnosis,16 17 as well as my own experiences of
psychiatric diagnoses. I am convinced that in order to engage in
full and robust ethical examination of the DSM–5 (and of other
psychiatric nosologies), we need to contend with two important
realities that have largely been ignored in the DSM–5 debates.
First, many (most?) people relate to psychiatric diagnosis—
iThere are a large number of examples that I could have chosen. My
selection was governed by my wish to indicate how inﬂuential voices of
those with clinical expertise—as well as the voices of journalists—have
contributed to polarising and/or caricaturing positions within the DSM–
5 discussions.
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perhaps particularly so when they have a diagnosis themselves—
in ways that are contextually variable, ambivalent and labile.
Second, the effects of and responses to psychiatric diagnosis are
profoundly uneven: they depend on what the actual diagnosis
is; who receives it; at what point in her life; whether it is her
ﬁrst or her sixth psychiatric diagnosis; what the particularities
of the healthcare systems of the region/country in which she
lives are; and what the other axes of identiﬁcation or ascription
are that inﬂuence how she is seen by others and/or sees
herself.18 My emphasis on ‘what the actual diagnosis is’ is
intended to draw attention to how unhelpful it is to lump all
psychiatric and neurodevelopmental diagnoses into one
umbrella category in relation to which normative judgements
vis-à-vis the worth of diagnosis are made. It is likely, for
example, that the ascription of bipolar 1 (recurrent psychotic
mania), schizophrenia and borderline personality disorder diag-
noses will carry different consequences, and be greeted in differ-
ent ways by those receiving them, from the ascription of
cyclothymia, depression—or, indeed, autism.
In order adequately to attend to these realities, we need to
consider diagnosis as classiﬁcation (the problematic that has
characterised, unsurprisingly, most of the DSM–5 debates) and
attend to diagnosis as a process.19 20 A focus on process allows
us to attend to how diagnostic practices are temporally and spa-
tially complex, and have effects at different scales. Psychiatric
diagnosis is not best thought of taking place in a single moment
in a single place; it is often not something that ‘matters’ for a
diagnosed person in the same way in all the spaces in which she
lives her life. Certain psychiatric diagnoses can usher in pro-
found and traumatic events carrying potentially irrevocable con-
sequences (eg, in many countries in Central and Eastern
Europe, a diagnosis is used as a ‘status’ ascription (see
Szmukler20a) in order to deprive people of their legal capacity,
which can lead to long-term institutionalisation).21 Certain diag-
noses might well serve as the catalyst for poorer treatment in
multiple domains (though this might well be the result of
compound effects of multiple forms of discrimination and
disempowerment, rather than the effect of the psychiatric diag-
nosis per se.)22 While there are many occasions in which
dispute about or negotiation around diagnosis (whether by clini-
cians or by the patient and/or family member) is very common,
there are, equally, many other occasions where such negotiation
or dispute hardly features. But it is far from clear whether all
psychiatric diagnoses always function as the ‘master status’23
that trump other elements of a person’s identity. The conse-
quences of psychiatric diagnosis are heterogeneous, as are the
manifold reactions to them from people who receive them.
Psychiatric diagnoses are engaged and lived with in multiple,
ambivalent and often contradictory ways.
Exploring diagnosis as process also allows us to discern how
deeply and unavoidably mediated processes of psychiatric diag-
nosis tend to be. My use of the adjective mediated, here, is
intended to refer to the general ways in which processes of com-
munication intervene in and fundamentally shape the creation
and circulation of meaning, and, more speciﬁcally, to what the
media theorist Roger Silverstone described as the ‘fundamen-
tally, but unevenly, dialectical process in which institutionalised
media of communication (the press, broadcast radio and televi-
sion, and … the worldwide web), are involved in the general cir-
culation of symbols in social life’.24 25 The DSM–5 discussions
have tended—implicitly if not explicitly—to portray diagnosis
as that which is imposed (by psychiatry, which has the power)
on the patient (who does not) (eg, ‘A label of psychiatric illness
would … be imposed on people who would fare much better
without one’).26 But a growing body of sociological and histor-
ical research indicates the intricate ways in which (proto)patients
and doctors negotiate over which diagnosis (if any) is given; in
which people ﬁght to be given particular diagnoses; and, in
which people identify with, and take on, particular diagnoses
prior to, or outside of, clinical contact.14 27 Psychiatric diagnosis
might still to a signiﬁcant extent be enabled by direct,
face-to-face encounters with the patient, rather than, as is the
case with numerous other diagnoses, by apparatuses and assays.
But it is far from being unmediated: a person commonly
receives, interprets and forms a relationship with a psychiatric
diagnosis via multiple, fragmented routes, many of which do
not involve direct encounters with a clinician. These routes
often entail complex engagements with various kind of paper-
work, with forms of media (including newspapers, internet fora,
social media, newspapers, etc), and through discussions with a
wide variety of people embedded in different frameworks
through which they understand ‘diagnosis’. We need to
approach diagnosis not only through a vision of straightforward
clinical encounters in which a clinician ‘gives’ a psychiatric diag-
nosis (and is interpreted as either good or bad for having done
so) and a patient, as passive vessel, is thereby entirely marked by
that diagnosis (whether for good or for ill).
To substantiate the arguments above, I present brief vignettes
from my own experiences of psychiatric diagnosis.
Nota bene: This example (n=1) should be read in the context
of all that has been said above. It is only one of many possible
experiences of responses to psychiatric diagnosis: I am in no way
representative. In particular, the cultural capital that accrues to
me through my education, class position and ethnicity, as well
as the particular diagnoses and treatments I received, undoubt-
edly mean my experiences of psychiatric diagnosis are likely to
have been more consensual and negotiatory than those of many
(particularly many of those receiving psychotic diagnoses and/or
involuntary treatment).
XXX.X
One day, not very long after the publication of DSM–IV,28 in
the US state of Maryland, I left a psychiatrist’s ofﬁce with two
sheets of paper. One was a psychopharmacological prescription;
the other a bill to send to my insurance company. Included on
the bill was an opaque code. I knew it was a DSM–IV code—I
was in the midst of doctoral course work on 20th-century
psychiatry—but had no idea what it denoted. I was fascinated
by the period after the ﬁrst three letters. What did the three
numbers–full stop–number mean? How, moreover, did they cor-
respond to the narratives I had recounted, the behaviours I had
demonstrated and described, and the intense affective states that
I had manifested in front of the psychiatrist?
The psychiatrist had not said a word about the diagnosis. At
that time, the internet was not yet omnipresent, and so I did
what many of us did in those long-lost, pre internet days when
one wanted to turn something opaque into something compre-
hensible: I went into the bowels of a library, pulled out the uni-
versity’s copy of the DSM–IV, and looked up ‘my’ diagnosis.
I tried to ﬁt the description of behaviour, affective state, bodily
speciﬁcs and internal mentation to my own experiences of the
days, and months that stretched behind me. (In other words,
what I found helped to frame my recollections of the previous
months as well as the experiences I was having in the present;
the diagnosis also functioned as an incitement to undertake a
series of hermeneutical inquiries.)
I also ﬁlled the pharmacological prescription and read all the
accompanying paperwork. I envisaged the side effects that I
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might shortly experience, which undoubtedly made me more
vigilant towards certain parts of my body. That vigilance played
a part in identifying—if not in actually helping to materialise—
some of the side effects that did, duly arrive. Direct-to-
Consumer Advertising on television had not started, and so I
did not have those representations of the mentally ill person
with ‘my’ diagnosis before and after pharmacological treatment
to help model the experience of psychiatric diagnosis. But I
talked to fellow graduate students and other friends who had
also received psychiatric diagnoses, made rather awkward inter-
net forays (it was the mid-1990s and most of us were still ama-
teurs online) and looked at email discussion lists. I participated,
alongside others, in attempts to discern whether similar diagno-
ses made us similar kinds of people; we wondered whether a
single DSM–IV psychiatric diagnosis was capacious enough to
allow for what appeared to us to be phenomenologically diverse
experiences. (In other words, a range of processes—the imbibing
of pharmacological prescriptions, the conversing over diagnoses
online and ofﬂine, the comparing of side effects, the telling and
retelling of illness histories—helped solidify particular ontologies
and phenomenologies of mental illness.)
When in a subsequent appointment, I tentatively asked the
psychiatrist about the code and hence the diagnosis, she simply
said, “Don’t take it too seriously, I don’t.” We never returned to
the question of diagnosis again.
PAPERWORK
Several years later, when I had moved back to the UK, my
general practitioner (GP) referred me into secondary psychiatric
care. I never knew what diagnosis I had received from him,
though he did say that because I was not responding to the
drugs I had been prescribed, the diagnosis might not be correct.
(In other words, here I was told that it might well be the
pharmacological interventions, rather than the physician himself,
that would be the key actor in achieving the correct diagnosis.)
While in secondary psychiatric care, I was copied in to
various letters being sent about me—and my mental illness—to
different people for different purposes. Here is a small
selection:
From the GP to the Head of Department: ‘I have signed ––– off
work for X months owing to [DIAGNOSIS A].’
From the psychiatrist to the GP: ‘She does indeed continue to
experience quite severe, incapacitating symptoms of ZZZ and
YYY, with pronounced secondary PPP. …. Overall, my impression
is of a severe [DIAGNOSIS B], with secondary features of QQQ,
which currently do not fulﬁl diagnostic criteria for [DIAGNOSIS
C].’
From the psychiatrist to the consultant psychotherapist: ‘I am
writing to request your opinion in regard of this interesting
woman, who suffers with severe, and at times disabling
[DIAGNOSIS D]’.
Exchanges between occupational health and department of
human resources: ‘––– has been on long term sick with
[DIAGNOSIS A]’. ‘She is receiving treatment for her condition
and her return to work will depend upon her response to this
treatment.’ ‘––– should be regarded as disabled as deﬁned by the
Disability Discrimination Act 1995.’ ‘While she will be prone to
recurrent illness in the future it is quite likely she will have long
periods of remission’.ii
From human resources to head of department: ‘––– is still signed
off work with [DIAGNOSIS A].’
What is of interest here? First, the diagnostic terms are used for
several distinct purposes: to underpin a medical insurance claim;
to justify to an employer why an employee was not at work; to
ensure that an employer fulﬁlled particular duties in relation to an
employee; to capture a case history that would later be appended
to a larger set of clinical records; to speak across clinical boundar-
ies (here, between psychiatry and psychotherapy) to ascertain if
psychotherapy might be appropriate alongside pharmacological
treatment; and to inform an employer how an employee was likely
to perform in the future. Second, not once has a clinician given a
diagnosis directly to me. I have received—if that is the correct verb
—several diagnoses through different kinds of paperwork; on
none was I the addressee. Diagnostic terms were commonly inter-
woven—often in complex ways—with the terms ‘condition’,
‘illness’, ‘disorder’ (as well as the language of symptoms). That
paperwork traced a disconcerting, fragmentary and highly
mediated journey—one that included two psychiatric taxonomic
systems, primary and secondary care, and insurance, employment
and human resources procedures. It incited in me signiﬁcant inter-
pretative activity, much of which I conducted outside of clinical
spaces. The extent to which the clinicians were committed to the
diagnostic terms they used—as opposed to employing them for
pragmatic reasons—was far from clear. (I remember, for example,
clinical occasions that, retrospectively, I interpreted as the psych-
iatrist implying that he would mobilise a diagnosis for purposes
whose ends he believed we had agreed upon.) These diagnoses
were central elements of a set of procedures that recounted my
past, presented others with aspects of what I was like in the
present, and prescribed me with a likely future. These diagnoses
undoubtedly marked me, and marked my life. But there are two,
crucial additional points: First, I in no way simply internalised
what was documented in this paperwork: my affective responses
to these various diagnostic terms have included puzzlement, relief,
recognition, anger, curiosity, reassurance and alienation (often
several at once), and they have varied signiﬁcantly over a number
of years. Second, I am emphatically not arguing that all
would have been straightforward if the clinicians were to have
spoken to me face to face about these diagnoses (nor, in fact, that I
would have preferred them to have done so). Rather, I want to
insist on two points, which I argue are generalisable across mul-
tiple psychiatric diagnoses and in relation to the majority of
people who receive diagnoses. (1) Experiences of psychiatric diag-
nosis are indispensably mediated: even if one’s clinician speaks
extensively face to face about the diagnosis, there is always a much
wider set of discourses and traces that frame the meanings of the
diagnosis; and (2) there are many layers of interpretation that lie
between the bald diagnostic category and the person who is posi-
tioned in relation to it (ie, one should not a priori assume that one
knows how the person so designated by that term might take it up
or reject it).
CONCLUSION
The DSM–5 discussions have tended to be polarised, and have
tended to present streamlined accounts of what a psychiatric
diagnosis is and whether the DSM–5 taxonomy is normatively
good or bad. Within this polarised landscape, diagnosis has
commonly been conceptualised as an event that is driven by
psychiatry, and that is discrete, punctual, and that ‘captures’ (for
good or ill) the person so designated. In contrast, this article
calls for greater attention to the messiness and diversity of reac-
tions to and positions regarding DSM–5, and of the
iiIn these exchanges, the language slips between ‘diagnosis’, ‘condition’
and ‘illness’.
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conﬁgurations through which psychiatry and mental health are
made and remade. I have argued, in particular, that we need to
keep in clear view greyer, more ambivalent accounts of psychi-
atric diagnosis. By this, I mean accounts that attend to how diag-
nosis comprises processes and practices that are highly mediated
across time and across space, and that incur temporally and spa-
tially heterogeneous and ambivalent responses from those who
receive them.
Those espousing certainty in relation to psychiatric diagnosis
(whichever end of the spectrum they lie) have tended to grab
much of the discursive space through which ethical issues sur-
rounding diagnosis might be deliberated, and have created an
environment—whether deliberately or not—in which a limited
number of concerns are commonly regarded as the central
ethical issues concerning psychiatric diagnosis. This is, in itself,
a matter of ethical concern. For example, current emphasis (in
light of the DSM–5 debates) on diagnosis as classiﬁcation rather
than as process has arguably deﬂected energy away from
focused consideration of if, when, how and by whom negoti-
ation over particular diagnoses does—and indeed should—take
place. The underacknowledgement of diagnosis as a highly
mediated set of practices has arguably resulted in a lack of crit-
ical reﬂection on how the communication of psychiatric diagno-
ses takes place (and indeed should take place). If, for example,
clinicians are no longer imagined as the primary conduit
through which a diagnosis is given—but rather as one node in a
complex network of inﬂuences, transmitters, and cultural atmo-
spheres that shape understandings of psychiatric diagnosis—how
might this affect the role of the clinician in communicating and
discussing psychiatric diagnoses? Or if every act of psychiatric
diagnosis is understood to be embedded in complex—and very
particular—social, legal, clinical, cultural, familial and
psychological conﬁgurations, how might this affect the act of
making normative judgements about whether diagnosis is ‘good’
or ‘bad’?
There are, in addition, potential ethical values and beneﬁts
that might be more easily opened up through ambivalence than
through (premature) certainty.29 These include the possibility of
delaying rather than rushing to judgement; of attending to
voices in these debates that are currently seldom or never heard;
of disaggregating clinicians’ use of psychiatric diagnoses from
any necessary agreement with, or endorsement of those diagno-
ses; of more capacious and balanced interrogations of the
achievements, limits and uses of psychiatric diagnosis; and,
ﬁnally, of attempting to doing conceptual and epistemic justice30
to the multifaceted ways in which those in receipt of psychiatric
diagnosis live with, through, against and beyond them.
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